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Abstract. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – an extension of the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between Canada and USA to include Mexico – went into effect on January 1, 1994, 
primarily as an agreement to eliminate restrictions on trade and investment over the course of twelve years.  
NAFTA is a trade agreement and after twelve years remains as such with limited prospects, if any, of 
widening or deepening the integration process.  Despite its narrow scope, the agreement became, from the 
start, controversial – and continues to be so – not only for trade and investment matters but for a whole host 
of other related issues. The other related issues include: the dispute settlement mechanism and side 
agreements on labor and environmental issues. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
“Put simply, NAFTA has been neither the disaster its opponents predicted nor the savior hailed 
by its supporters” Audley J, (2003, p. 7)  
  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – an extension of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between Canada and USA to include Mexico – went into effect on January 1, 1994, primarily as an 
agreement to eliminate restrictions on trade and investment over the course of twelve years.  NAFTA is a 
trade agreement and after thirteen years remains as such with limited prospects, if any, of widening or 
deepening the integration process.   
Despite its narrow scope, the agreement became, from the start, controversial – and continues to 
be so – not only for trade and investment matters but for a whole host of other related issues. The other 
related issues include: the dispute settlement mechanism, membership enlargement, monetary integration, 
and side agreements on labor and environmental issues. 
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As NAFTA moves into its second decade, these issues require more urgent attention especially as 
the long-term effects of the treaty, anticipated or not, is slowly emerging. In this study we provide a 
retrospective assessment and evaluation of NAFTA thirteen years later and raise some of the issues that 
require immediate attention as we look to the future.  Accordingly, in Section 1 we contrast NAFTA with 
the European Union (EU), in Section 2 we discuss the recent trend towards bilateralism, in Section 3 we 
look critically at NAFTA thirteen years later, and in the last section we raise some of the challenges 
affecting the future of NAFTA. 
 
 
2. NAFTA and the EU 
At the time, NAFTA was a unique case of integration in the world as it involved the integration of a 
developing county with two industrial ones. The per capita income of the US was six times that of Mexico. 
Whereas, in contrast, the per capita income of Germany – wealthiest – was twice that of Greece –poorest – 
among the EU 15.   
NAFTA, unlike the European Union, is a trilateral agreement. NAFTA is structured as three bilateral 
agreements, one between Canada and the United States, a second between Mexico and the United States, 
and a third between Canada and Mexico. The first accord is CFTA, which took effect on January 1, 1989, 
and is subsumed by NAFTA. The second and third agreements are found in NAFTA itself. 
Today, more than a decade later, NAFTA has not enlarged its membership to include other countries 
in the Americas.  Since its inception, however, there have been several efforts to expand free trade 
agreements – at a multilateral level – in the Americas.  But unlike the EU, which has established an 
elaborate legal process and criteria – albeit bureaucratic and sometimes intrusive – for the accession of new 
members, the NAFTA accession clause – article 2204 – provides no such clear guidance and criteria.  It 
leaves it up to the individual members. 
 
According to Robert A. Pastor (2004, p. 124): 
 
“Although NAFTA fueled the train of continental integration, it did not provide 
conductors to guide it”. 
“No clause in the agreement established a mechanism to anticipate or respond to 
market failures. Whereas the EU has created too many intrusive institutions, North 
America made the opposite mistake: it created almost none”  
 
In fact, in the absence of clear criteria in the Agreement,  the candidate country must be willing and 
able to accept the conditions of the so-called Washington Consensus, a term coined by John Williamson 
which includes reducing fiscal deficits, tax reform, exchange and interest rate reform, privatization, FDI, 
deregulation, etc.  
Chile tried without success to become part of NAFTA. Instead all three NAFTA countries opted to 
sign separate bilateral agreements with Chile. For sometime now there is a preference for bilateral over 
multilateral agreements. In all three countries there are a number of bilateral free trade agreements. This 
attitude, according to Pastor, has been largely deliberate. He points out that “Integration has usually taken 
the form of dual bilateralism – U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian – rather than a continental partnership.” 
We will elaborate on this issue in the next section. 
It is important to remember that unlike the EU, NAFTA was designed as a trade agreement with no 
political dimension or vision attached. The treaty was solely based on unlocking the economic benefits 
within the three trading countries of North American.  NAFTA was more of an experiment in international 
trade and economic theory but on no account did include the political aspiration of the EU.  This 
fundamental difference casts a shadow over NAFTA’s achievements so far and its future development.  
 
3.  NAFTA and Rising Bilateralism 
The World Bank (2005) reports that there is a proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) that now 
surpasses 200,  a six-fold increase in the last twenty years. This covers more than one-third of world trade 
and “… is fundamentally altering the world trade landscape.” The World Bank report notices that the EU 
and United States are the most prominent players in this proliferation process. This includes reciprocal 
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treaties such as NAFTA, the EU-Mediterranean Bilateral Agreement, and South-South agreements like 
MERCOSUR. 
Moreover, according to Francois Bourguignon (2004) 
  
“Since Cancun, it can be observed that major economies in North America and in 
Europe have redoubled efforts to seek bilateral and regional trade agreements.  The U.S. 
has recently signed a trade agreement with Chile, and has a trade agreement with 
Central America.  The EU is presently negotiating with MERCOSUR.  And then the 
question arises whether these agreements complement the effort to achieve a pro-
development WTO round, or do they stand in the way and threaten to derail these 
negotiations in WTO.  We need to address this question.” 
 
The report argues that agreements leading to open regionalism – that is, deeper integration of trade as a 
result of low external tariffs, increased services competition, and efforts to reduce cross-border and customs 
delays costs – are effective as part of a larger trade strategy to promote growth. Such regional agreements 
can complement a strategy that, on the one hand, includes autonomous liberalization to promote 
productivity gains and, on the other hand, leverages domestic reforms to enhance market access. Although 
regional agreements can prove beneficial to member countries, they can have adverse effects on excluded 
countries. Lowering of border barriers around the world is crucial to minimizing these effects. It is hoped 
that future agreement by all countries in the World Trade Organization on global trade issues will reduce 
the risk of trade diversion associated with regional agreements and will decrease trade losses of countries 
excluded from agreements. 
The report also says that key ingredients of RTAs that promote development include low external 
border barriers, promotion of new cross-border competition, nonrestrictive rules of origin, few sectoral and 
product exemptions, and more open services markets. Effective RTAs can help reduce regional political 
tensions, exploit economies of scale in infrastructure provision, and lead to joint programs to improve 
border crossings. However, Richard Newfarmer, Economic Adviser in the Bank's Trade Department and 
lead author of GEP (2005) states that 
 
“Neither North-South bilateral agreements nor South-South arrangements get 
universally high marks,” “U.S. and EU bilateral agreements often fall short of full free 
trade because they exclude sensitive products, commonly agriculture, or they adopt 
restrictive rules of origin that effectively deny market access. South-South agreements are 
sometimes more liberal in goods trade, but rarely expand competition in services and 
often lag in implementation. And few agreements seize the opportunity to provide for 
temporary movement of workers.” 
 
William R. Cline (2004), in a comprehensive study published by the Center for Global Development 
and the Institute for International Economics argues that the elimination of tariffs and other protective 
barriers globally would: 
 
• lift at least 500 million of people out of poverty over 15 years 
• create long-term economic benefits to developing countries of $200 billion per year, and 
• liberalization of agriculture would account for about half of the total gains for both developing and 
industrial countries. (Cline, 2004) 
  
Notwithstanding the above, the World Bank report concludes: “… regional trade agreements offer 
benefits to developing countries provided that these trade agreements do not occur behind a wall of 
protection or behind an increased role of protection.” 
 However, some strongly argue against the bilateral trend currently pursued by the U.S and the 
E.U. Jeffrey Schott (2004), in a major study by the Institute for International Economics, proposes that 
“The United States should recast its trade negotiating priorities to pursue fewer but bigger deals.” (Schott, 
2004). He argues that “big stakes” FTAs yield the largest payoff for US firms, workers, and farmers, while 
also providing strong support for ongoing WTO negotiations.  As such, we believe the U.S. needs to 
refocus its efforts away from bilateralism in the interest of more comprehensive and multilateral trade 
agreements. 
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4.  NAFTA after Thirteen Years: A Critical Assessment 
 
It has been thirteen years since the implementation of NAFTA and the controversy over its value continues.  
The promises of the proponents of NAFTA – that it would create hundreds of thousands of new jobs, raise 
the standards of living of USA, Mexico, and Canada, improve the environment and boost the development 
of Mexico – are questionable.  The opponents of NAFTA argue that jobs have been lost, domestic policy 
making has been undermined, and environmental and health conditions have suffered.  Why such disparity 
of views?  The proponents of NAFTA have apparently built their position on the assumptions that free 
trade is good for every country and that privatization is largely the answer to development.  Powerful 
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been among the 
proponents of this view. The opponents to NAFTA argue that the market and free trade alone are not 
necessarily the best ways to economic development, sustainability, and social justice.  Furthermore, they 
argue that the questionable results from NAFTA mitigate against its expansion into more countries in Latin 
America.  
One of the problems with NAFTA is that integration was tried among countries of such disparate 
levels of development.  For instance, gross national income per capita for Mexico, Canada, and the USA 
was $7,310, $32,600, and $43,740 in 2005 respectively; that is, Mexico’s gross national income per capita 
was one sixth of that of the USA.  Because of NAFTA there was an assumption that Mexican agriculture 
would be modernized and become more productive, but NAFTA provided no financial assistance to this 
end.  Since 1958 the European Union has provided under the common agricultural policy large amounts of 
financial assistance to old and new members in support of their agriculture.  New members whose income 
levels were low became eligible to receive structural funds for economic development in an effort to move 
the European Union members toward social and economic cohesion.  A more specific look into 
developments in the three NAFTA countries in recent years shows briefly the following. 
 
NAFTA and the US Case. In the case of the US a small trade surplus with Mexico before NAFTA 
has become a large trade deficit after NAFTA. The US trade deficit with Canada has increased fivefold. It 
is estimated that about half a million US jobs have been lost due to NAFTA. Many workers who lost high 
paying jobs in manufacturing have moved into service jobs with considerably lower wages.  The US had a 
total trade deficit of $436 billion in 2002 of which 20% was with its NAFTA partners. 
  It is also argued that NAFTA is an investment agreement which grants foreign investors a new set 
of rights to encourage relocation abroad of businesses. US farmers were told that NAFTA would provide 
access of US agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada and would improve the status of US farmers.  The 
experience of farmers after NAFTA shows that 38,000 US small farms have been eliminated and farm 
income has gone down. However, agribusiness profits are up. 
NAFTA had a minimal effect on the wage level and widening disparity between skilled and 
unskilled labor in the U.S. But Sandra Polaski observes a decoupling in productivity growth from wage 
growth in the U.S which, she argues, can partly be attributed to NAFTA because workers bargaining 
position had been weakened. (Polaski, 2006) 
 
NAFTA and Canada. Canada has experienced a large increase in its exports to the USA but not as 
large an increase as in its imports from the USA.  Canada’s real per capita growth averaged an increase of 
1.6% per year during the period 1989-2002.  Productivity growth averaged 2% per year for the 1994-2002 
period while wages rose by an annual rate of .4% per year (Foster and Dillion). This suggests that 
employers, not workers, benefited from the higher output per hour. Between 1995 and 2001 unemployment 
averaged 8.6% per year. Many of the jobs created during NAFTA have been part-time, insecure jobs with 
few benefits.  A study of the labor market in Canada found that under NAFTA part-time workers, mostly 
women, earn about two-thirds the wages of full-time workers and less than 20% receive benefits.  In 1996 
11.6% of employed workers held temporary jobs. 
There were 2400 fewer jobs in the agri-food processing industry in 2002 than in 1988. Some 16% of 
Canadian farmers have been forced off the land.  The National Farmers Union said in 2002 that free-trade 
agreements may increase trade but they alter the relative size and market power of the players.  “Free trade 
helps Cargill and Monsanto, not farmers.” 
 According to Polaski, Canada has experienced an increase in productivity since the signing of 
NAFTA.  However, this growth in productivity has not translated into an equivalent growth in wages.  
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Increase in productivity has substantially exceeded growth in wages both in the manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing sectors. (Polaski, 2006) 
 She goes on to say that income inequality in Canada has been trending upward for the past decade 
with only the richest 20 percent of households experiencing an increase in real income.  The rest 
experienced a sharp decline in real income in the early years of the treaty followed by a slight recovery.  
However, the recovery was not strong enough to overcome the initial decline.  
 
NAFTA and Mexico. Concerning Mexico the argument advanced was that NAFTA would help 
raise the standard of living and make it closer to its partners in NAFTA.  Thirteen years later more than 1.5 
million farm jobs have been destroyed as cheap US corn came into Mexico reducing prices received by 
Mexican farmers by 70%. As a result rural workers have moved into Mexico’s urban areas where under-
employment has kept wages low. The average wage paid to Mexico’s main factory workers dropped from 
$5 per day to $4. 
When NAFTA got started about 8 million of Mexico’s people were involved in agriculture (about ¼ 
of the active labor force).  By 2003 this number had fallen to 6.5 million.  Most of Mexico’s agricultural 
economy, was comprised of small plots of land (ejidos) given to Mexico’s farmers through land reform that 
took place in Mexico’s post-revolution era in 1917.  But NAFTA asserted that land could be owned by 
foreigners. It allowed plots of land to be sold. It also permitted creditors to seize land.  Farm programs that 
provided price guarantees, low interest rates, and subsidies were eliminated. 
Desperation among farmers has stimulated a social movement under the name “The Countryside 
Can’t Take It Anymore” leading to national protests in 2002 and 2003.  After ten years, increased 
investment and exports have not translated into the promised benefits. 
Data show that foreign direct investment in Mexico increased from the annual average in 1986-93 of 
$3.46 billion to $24.73 billion in 2001. Exports of Mexico ranked 54th in 2002.  Per capita income 
increased by 9% during the NAFTA years, but this is less than 1/3 of the increases in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Increased investment and exports have not had a broad impact.  Specific rules of NAFTA limited 
regulation of foreign investors in terms of the impact on the Mexican economy.  Mexico became an easy in, 
easy out, investment country.  About 1/3 of the 800,000 manufacturing jobs created under NAFTA have 
disappeared because companies have gone to cheaper labor markets such as China, Malaysia, and 
Guatemala. 
The environment and public health not only have not improved but industrialization on the border has 
increased toxic dumping and water contamination.   The environmental infrastructures in Mexico have not 
kept pace with increases in pollution as a result of the rapid growth in trade.    NAFTA has proven unable 
to address these problems. 
5. Summarizing the Main Problems with NAFTA 
 
All the indications are that Mexico has not greatly benefited from NAFTA.  Exports have not been an 
engine of growth.  Exports are concentrated in a few companies with few connections to local production.  
Their export production has not created more employment.  Foreign investment has not created much 
employment either because much of it represents the acquisition of companies.  Sandra Polaski, in her 
testimony to the senate finance committee, points out the surprising weak job creation in Mexico which 
operated at less than full employment level, a result that does not sit well from the perspective of economic 
and trade theories. As a result, some call into question the value of NAFTA and argue that NAFTA 
represents a model not to be imitated.  Market forces may not solely be relied on to produce development.  
A national plan to establish conditions conducive to each country’s development is needed. 
With regard to Canada, University of Toronto Professor Stephen Clarkson declares that NAFTA is 
essentially a “Supra-Constitution.”  It empowers some actors and dis-empowers civil-society organizations 
and citizens who look to the state to resolve their problems.  Corporations enjoy and exploit their rights 
under NAFTA.  What is needed is an enhanced NAFTA accord which goes beyond the silent integration of 
markets and deals with the social dimensions of development, that is, environment, labor, energy, services, 
and transport.  This sort of project, something close to the European model, is not likely to receive much 
support among businesses and the respective parliaments of the NAFTA partners. 
Many economists argue that trade liberalization has contributed to income inequality in the US in 
recent years.  Trade liberalization has helped increase corporate profits and the income of highly educated 
workers at the expense of less educated workers.  Estimates state that trade liberalization has cost 75% of 
US non-college workers an amount equal to 12.2% of their current wages.  In 1973 the real hourly wage for 
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high-school graduates peaked at $13.36 a level to which they had still not returned by 2001.  On the other 
hand, US corporate profits rose by 88% in the 1990s and CEO pay by 463% (Lawrence, Berstein and 
Boushy, 2003). 
 
6. Future Prospects for NAFTA 
 
The empirical evidence gathered thus far lends little support for the value of NAFTA in its current structure 
as a trade agreement to eliminate restriction on trade and investment among its members.  The empirical 
data challenge the economic rationale behind NAFTA which advocates that free trade on its own will 
promote economic efficiency and growth.  In a paper that examines the history and fate of regional 
economic integration attempts, A.G Malliaris and A.J Kondonassis show that “Integration agreements that 
did not progress beyond trade aspects eventually faded away” and “Regional economic integrations 
schemes that went beyond free trade to monetary union, often resulted in full political unions.” (Malliaris 
and Kondonasis, 1996, p. 33) 
In light of these historical cases, will NAFTA eventually “fade away” or is the prospect for further 
economic integration, including monetary integration?  Will the trend towards bilateralism outlined above 
lead to the demise of NAFTA or will this trend ultimately strengthen NAFTA by offering pathways to more 
comprehensive multilateral agreements? These are some of the questions on which the future of NAFTA 
depends. Where does the current debate stand on these issues? 
On the monetary front, there has been little development in the past thirteen years. But as NAFTA 
moves into its second decade, the issue remains in the background and debate continues on whether or not a 
further economic integration is possible or desirable.  With the European template in sight, monetary union 
of NAFTA appears as the natural progression and extension of the trading treaty. However, the issue 
doesn’t seem to attract much attention and is quietly debated in the academic circles and among business 
leaders with no apparent rush. 
  With the exception of two periods – namely, the 1994-1995 peso crisis and the latter part of the 
1990’s when the Canadian dollar weakened against the dollar – none of the members has been in a hurry to 
push the monetary integration issue. Mexico and Canada fully understand that pursuing further integration 
at this stage would likely occur on U.S. terms and conditions. This means mirroring the U.S. institutional, 
financial, and regulatory approach in NAFTA. From the U.S. perspective, further integration at this stage 
may be met with political resistance as people are still anxious and unconvinced that the trade agreement, 
let alone a monetary union, has been in the best interests of the U.S. 
  Although the debate has not reached the desk of policy makers, all members of the treaty 
recognize the benefit of monetary integration of some sort. The direction of any further economic 
integration is unclear with some arguing for a dollarization approach in which Mexico and Canada would 
adopt the U.S. dollar as their official currency while others argues for a full monetary union that mirrors 
that of European Union.  Neither approach is a clear winner.  Proponents of dollarization argue that given 
the dominant role of the United States in NAFTA, dollarization is the most reasonable and likely outcome 
of any monetary integration of the region. Furthermore, NAFTA shouldn’t be compared with the EU as a 
model for monetary integration since the two treaties are fundamentally different. For starters, none of the 
EU members carries the weight and dominance that the United States has in NAFTA. But more 
importantly, the monetary union of the EU members is a product of a wider political agreement between its 
members. NAFTA, in contrast, was drafted as a trading agreement with no political dimensions or 
aspirations. Since NAFTA lacks the political dimension on which the EU was built, the best approach to 
monetary integration is, perhaps by default, dollarization. 
The other important issue that confronts NAFTA is the rise in bilateral trade agreements and away 
from comprehensive multilateral agreements. We can only hope that the trend towards bilateral agreements, 
which tend to be less cumbersome and easier to accomplish, is not a rejection of the multilateral approach.  
Since the greatest payoff for the U.S. lies in a comprehensive multilateral agreement, we hope that 
numerous but smaller agreements, as they mature, will pave the ground for larger and more comprehensive 
agreement. 
It is clear from this debate that NAFTA is in need of redefinition of its identity and restructuring 
of it current purpose to go beyond trade for the treaty to have future prospect.  
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7.  NAFTA: the Second Decade 
Looking ahead to the prospects of economic integration in the Americas, here are some of the issues that 
we believe need to be addressed, with deliberate speed, in the second decade: 
 
1. NAFTA is a trade agreement and after ten years remains as such, but is limited. It falls short of a full free 
trade agreement because it includes many exclusions that effectively deny market access.  Although the 
prospects of removing these exclusions, and widening or deepening the integration process are limited, it is 
imperative that the three countries move towards a common external tariff. 
 
2. Despite its narrow scope, the agreement became, from the start, controversial - and it will continue to be 
so - not only for trade and investment matters but for a whole host of other related issues. The other related 
issues include: the dispute settlement mechanism and side agreements on labor and environmental issues. 
Accordingly, the impact on the environment, migration, the Mexican democracy and NAFTA’s 
dispute settlement mechanism will dominate public debate. Although political pressure for corrective 
action, some within the next ten years, is – in our view – expected, we believe political pressure on 
immigration and outsourcing will be more immediate.  
In short, what is needed is a NAFTA plus accord which goes beyond the silent integration of markets 
and deals with social dimensions of development, e.g., environment, labor, energy, services, transport.   
 
3. NAFTA and North American economic integration is at a crossroads as it faces an immediate challenge. 
The fallout from 911 threatens to seriously undermine North American integration. According to Hufbauer 
and Schott (2004): 
 
“After Sept. 11, 2001, the United States imposed new security measures that made it 
costly and cumbersome to move goods and people across borders. They created a zone of 
uncertainty around Canada and Mexico. The threat of another terrorist attack risks a 
new round of onerous controls on cross-border flows. Clearly, joint action by the three 
NAFTA partners is essential to minimize that danger” (Hufbauer and Schott, 2004) 
 
4. The blackout of August 2003 that left 50 million people without electricity raises serious concerns over 
the adequacy of the regional electric grids. This highlights the urgency of energy issues that NAFTA failed 
to address. 
 
5. A 34-country free trade arrangement through the newly proposed ‘Free Trade Areas of the Americas’ 
(FTAA) is planned to be signed no later than December 2005. The Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) 
presented the third draft of the Agreement in November 2003 at the Miami Ministerial Conference. The 
FTAA draft is based on NAFTA provisions on trade and investment, and on the GATS provisions on 
services under the WTO. Not surprisingly, the FTAA has been controversial from the start, not only for 
trade and investment matters, but for a whole host of other related issues that were bitterly debated over 
NAFTA.  
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